July 5 @ 11:30 - 13:00 Wroclaw (CEST)
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES
Judicial independence and constitutionalism are generally closely associated with democracy. However, courts‘ decisions against the political interests of other branches of the state in developing democracies (e.g. Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt and Argentina), in recent decades suggests that a significant degree of judicial independence can exist without having an established democracy. While most of these countries have weak institutions for the rule of law and have unstable constitutional histories, the judiciaries in these countries are able to promote the enforcement of constitutions against the political interests of the government. How can we account for increasing judicial independence and constitutionalism with a limited degree of the rule of law in developing democracies? A few studies have addressed this question. This panel aims to examine and evaluate different social, political, and legal factors of judicial independence and constitutionalism in developing democracies.