Beyond parliamentarism, presidentialism & semi-presidentialism: Exploring a neglected model of separating power
Most debates on legislative-executive relations have focussed on the (pure) parliamentarism, presidentialism, and two varieties of semi-presidentialism. Recent contributions in comparative constitutional law and political science have added a fourth model of separative power: a constitutional systems in which two chambers of a legislative assembly are directly elected (usually employing different electoral systems), but only one of them can remove the prime minister and cabinet through a no-confidence vote. The other chamber acts as a checking chamber alone. These systems potentially optimize the strengths of presidential and parliamentary systems as well as of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. They may be more resilient in the face of democratic backsliding too. The panel will discuss different versions of this new model, characterised as “semi-parliamentarism“ (Ganghof 2018, 2021) or “moderated parliamentarism“ (Khaitan 2021).